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Many people think European Community law is made centrally in Brussels and 
carried out by the member states. 1 Although this characterization is accurate in 
certain respects, it has always been an oversimplification. From the 
Community’s beginning, central institutions have been wholly responsible in 
some areas for enforcement and formulation of the more detailed rules 
necessary to implement policy (administration communautaire directe). Today 
Community administration is more extensive than ever as a result of the 
growing number of laws that must be put into effect and the establishment of 
European agencies with jurisdiction over new drug authorizations, trademarks, 
and other matters. The expert committees that bear a large part of the workload 
number well over 4002 and that is not counting European agencies, the 
standardization organizations used by the Community for harmonization, and 
the numerous internal working groups set up by the Council and Commission.
Following the Danish "No" to the Maastricht Treaty the administrative 
facet of Community government, like all others, has come under attack as being 
undemocratic, removed from the European peoples and unaccountable to the 
person on the street. The term that has been coined to refer to a vast 
subcategory of Community administrative action, "comitology," says a lot 
about the common perception of administration in Brussels. In some minds it 
might conjure images of apparatchiks and in others an inaccessible and arid 
science, but it will certainly not evoke thoughts of cheerful civil servants happy 
to explain to the public-at-large what they are doing and, should it not approve, 
change course.
Policymakers and academics have looked to American administrative law 
as a source of inspiration for how Community administration can become more 
democratic.3 In this paper I consider a subset of the American law that has been 
proposed for the Community: the administrative procedure known as notice and 
comment rulemaking and the judicial review that apply when an administrative 
agency issues the detailed rules necessary to implement statutory regulatory
' For a description of executive federalism in the EC see Lenaerts, K. (1991) "Some 
Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community”, Common Market Law 
Review, 28, 1, 11-36, at 13-14.
~ See General Budget on the European Union for the Financial Year 1997, 1997 O.J. (L 44) 
1, at 485.
3 See, e.g., Majone, G. (1998) "Europe’s Democracy Deficit’: The Question of Standards", 
European Law Journal 4. 1, 5-28; Craig, P.P. (1997) "Democracy and Rule-making Within 
the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment", European Law Journal, 3, 2, 105-130; 




























































































schemes.4 The first section of this article lays down the basics of Community 
rulemaking, develops a set of criteria for the design of good Community 
administration, and evaluates Community rulemaking based on these criteria. In 
this section I find that Community rulemaking fares poorly on two criteria, 
accountability to democratic institutions and fairness. Next I argue that the 
Community can draw lessons from the United States because of an important 
similarity between their systems of government, a similarity that suggests that 
they face the same problems in designing their administrative states. In both 
constitutional systems, power is shared among independent branches of 
government. Consequently a divided lawmaking principal must hold the 
bureaucracy accountable. Moreover, the pluralist interest participation that 
already exists in policy formulation - largely a result of shared legislative power 
and independent branches of government - must be guaranteed in policy 
implementation. I then turn to one of the tools that has been used in the United 
States to address these structural problems, the administrative law of notice and 
comment rulemaking and judicial review. In sections three and four I describe 
how it operates, primarily through a case study of hazardous waste legislation. I 
proceed to draw on the considerable literature on notice and comment that has 
been generated by the American academy over the past twenty years to 
critically assess its advantages and disadvantages. Then, in section six, I 
describe the changes that notice and comment rulemaking and judicial review 
would entail in the Community. Finally, in the last section, I put forward a 
rulemaking proposal for the Community which incorporates the basic features 
of American notice and comment but also makes use of some of the reforms 
suggested by the academy. I argue that the expected improvements in 
accountability to democratic institutions and interest participation support the 
introduction of such a procedure but that it should be modified to reflect 
societal differences in attitudes toward experts and courts and in the nature of 
interest organization.
I. Community Rulemaking
A. The Basics o f Implementing Rules
In the Community, lawmaking power is vested in the Commission, Council and 
Parliament acting together in a formula that depends upon the policy area and is 
set out in the Treaties. As in all modem governments, however, the Community 
legislature relies upon its bureaucracy to produce the more detailed rules that 
make the system work in practice. One of the principal classes of Community
4 In this paper I use “notice and comment” and “rulemaking" to refer to both the 




























































































rules are so-called implementing rules.5 They can be found in many different 
policy areas, from agriculture, to the environment, to transportation and 
generally fill in technical gaps, adapt legislation to changing circumstances, or 
bring legislation up-to-date with the newest science.6
Implementing rules may be issued following one of three basic 
procedures. Some earlier Community legislation gives the Commission sole 
rulemaking power. On the other extreme, the Council tends to retain 
decisionmaking power for itself when an issue is particularly sensitive, directly 
deciding the matter on a proposal from the Commission. The third and by far 
most common way in which implementing rules are adopted is by the 
Commission acting under the indirect control of the Council, so-called 
comitology. Control is indirect because a committee of member state experts is 
charged with day-to-day supervision of Commission rulemaking and the 
Council itself is called in only if the Commission and committee, after 
negotiation, are unable to agree.7
In comitology, Commission discretion is more or less fettered depending 
upon which of the three types of committees - advisory, management or 
regulatory - is established to monitor rulemaking.8 These are set out in the 
Comitology Decisions which serves as a framework to which the Community 
legislature generally resorts when it designs the administrative process to be 
used in implementing a particular piece of legislation. One or two 
representatives from each of the member states sit on the committees, a 
Commission representative serves as chair, and the representatives vote by 
qualified majority. In all cases, the Commission must submit its proposal to the 
committee for an opinion. When an advisory committee is involved, its opinion 
does not carry formal weight and the measure goes into effect regardless of the 
committee’s vote. If either a management or regulatory committee votes against 
the Commission proposal or, in the case of a regulatory committee, fails to 
issue an opinion (because there does not exist a qualified majority in favor of 
the Commission proposal) the measure is sent to the Council.
5 The other major form of Community rules, technical standards, raises additional issues and 
falls outside of the scope of this paper.
6 See Schaefer, G.F. (1996) "Committees in the EC Policy Process: A First Step Towards 
Developing a Conceptual Framework" in Pedler, R.H. and Schaefer, G.F. (eds.) Shaping 
European Law and Policy, Maastricht, EIPA, 3-23, at 17.
7 Experts are appointed by their national executives and are generally national civil servants 
with the relevant technical expertise.
8 This discussion is drawn from Demmke, C. et al. (1996) "The Flistory of Comitology” in 
Pedler, R.H. and Schaefer, G.F. (eds.) Shaping European Law and Policy, Maastricht, EIPA, 
61-82 and Vos, E. (1998) "The Rise o f Committees", European Law Journal 3, 3, 210-229.




























































































There exist two essential differences between the management and 
regulatory procedures. First, management committees have a veto power while 
regulatory committees have the greater power of assent. Although the point 
might seem a bit academic, the Commission in the first must simply get enough 
committee members on its side to escape a veto while in the second must obtain 
the votes necessary for a favorable opinion. Second, in the management variety, 
the Commission proposal may take effect immediately after the committee 
delivers its opinion, even if it is negative, whereas with the regulatory variety 
the Commission must wait and give the Council a chance to adopt a different 
decision.
Management and regulatory committees are subdivided into two different 
classes. With a filet (safety-net) management committee, the Commission may, 
if it chooses, defer application of the measure for a period no longer than one 
month from the date of communication to the Council and within this period 
the Council may adopt a different decision, by qualified majority if the 
Commission agrees and by unanimity if the Commission is not in agreement, or 
it may fail to act (there might be an even split in the Council, in which case 
qualified majority voting is impossible). If the management committee is of the 
contre-filet (double safety-net) variety, the Commission must defer application 
for a period to be laid down in the legislation, not to exceed three months from 
the date of communication to the Council, during which time the Council may 
adopt a different decision. Likewise, once a regulatory committee issues its 
opinion, the Commission proposal may take one of two routes. Under the filet 
procedure, the Council may adopt a different decision, by qualified majority if 
the Commission agrees and by unanimity if the Commission is not in 
agreement, or it may fail to act. Should the Council fail to act within a 
maximum of three months, then the Commission proposal takes effect. Under 
the second, contre-filet procedure the Council has an additional option: it may, 
by bare majority, vote against the proposal, thus making it easier for the 
Council to veto a Commission proposal.
As with all Community acts, implementing rules may be reviewed by the 
European Court of Justice. As I explain in greater depth below, under Article 
173 of the Treaty Community institutions may go directly to the Court of 
Justice to challenge implementing rules. 10 Individuals, on the other hand, must 
generally wait for rules to be enforced locally, challenge enforcement in their 
domestic courts, and then request that the national court obtain a preliminary 
ruling from the Court of Justice under Article 177 of the Treaty. The Court of 
Justice reviews implementing rules on procedural grounds, questions of 
statutory or Treaty interpretation, and rule-specific evidence and reasoning.




























































































At first glance, the call for democratic administration is somewhat paradoxical. 
In our modem world, democracy cannot be understood as the Athenian polis or, 
less ambitiously, as citizens voting for representatives who in turn govern by 
majority vote. Powers are delegated to bureaucracies precisely because 
legislatures do not want to be in the business of legislating minutiae and 
deciding on the case-by-case application of the law. Administration 
accountable to democratic institutions at the same time as it is speedy, expert, 
and fair is the more exact way of putting what liberal democracies strive for 
when designing their bureaucracies.il
Accountability, fairness, expertise, and speed figure differently in 
adjudication and rulemaking, the two major forms of government 
administration. 12 It is convenient to think of an agency as a court for some 
purposes and a legislature for others. When an agency makes a determination of 
individual liability based on past or present facts it is obliged to follow trial- 
type procedures because of their value as fact-finding tools and guarantees of 
individual rights in the face of state action. Judicial review tends to be 
demanding because even though the matter has been delegated in the interest of 
efficiency to a specialized agency, it is one that would traditionally have been 
handled by courts and therefore judicial notions of fair play and due process 
weigh heavily. In administration through adjudication, fairness ranks high, 
expertise less so, and speed and accountability are of equal importance.
In rulemaking, the class of government action to which Community 
implementing rules belong, the administration is generally allowed to resort to 
different, less cumbersome procedures. When an agency establishes future 
rights and liabilities for a class of individuals or other regulated entities, the 
relevant facts are mostly scientific or social scientific. Consequently, scientific 
experiments and epidemiological and statistical studies are generally more 
useful fact-finding tools than witness cross-examination and other trial-type 
procedures. Further, since the decision does not implicate the use of state 
coercion at a single individual’s expense but rather represents a trade-off 
between different socioeconomic interests whose effects will be widely felt,
B. A Definition of Good Administration
1 * See Dehousse, R. (1998) “Citizens' Rights and the Reform of Comitology Procedures: The 
Case for a Pluralist Approach”, EUI Florence, RSC Policy Paper no. 98/4, at 9-10. Dehousse 
defines the values that legitimate Community administration as legislative mandate, 
accountability, due process, expertise, and efficiency.
12 As should be clear from the discussion that follows, whether administrative action is 
considered adjudication or rulemaking depends on the nature of the decision being made and 




























































































participation cannot be conceived as a right to push the state to the wall and test 
fully enforcement of the law in that instance. Rather it should be framed as the 
right of those who will be affected to give views and information that, together 
with a host of other considerations, aid government decisionmaking. Here, 
judicial review is generally narrow in scope because judges are neither trained 
to evaluate the scientific evidence nor institutionally suited to make the 
socioeconomic trade-offs entailed by rulemaking. To return to the list of values 
involved in the design of good bureaucracy, expertise ranks high, 
accountability and speed retain their importance, and fairness changes meaning, 
now defined as the right of interested parties to give views and information.
C. Evaluating Implementing Rules
Implementing rules score poorly on both accountability to democratic 
institutions and fairness. The comitology process is shrouded in secrecy, 
preventing the European Parliament from keeping an eye on national and 
Community officials. Although a series of interinstitutional agreements require 
the Commission to communicate to Parliament proposals, draft comitology 
committee agendas, and committee voting results, these procedures have 
proven unsatisfactory. 13 Even if Parliament were to have adequate information, 
it would not have the tools necessary to influence the course of rulemaking. 
Formally, Parliament’s institutional role in policy implementation is minimal. 
Under the Modus Vivendi signed by Parliament, the Council, and the 
Commission in 1994, Parliament’s views on proposals intended to implement 
co-decision legislation must he "[taken] into account to the greatest extent 
possible" by the Commission and should Parliament give a negative opinion on 
an implementing measure being decided by the Council, an attempt must be 
made "in the appropriate framework" to find "a solution." 14 Informally, 
Parliament may pressure the Commission to modify implementing rules with 
parliamentary questions and resolutions and by using its budgetary powers. 15 
While parliamentary questions and resolutions are a weak means of influencing 
implementation, the budgetary power is a strong but blunt tool that can only be 
called upon in situations where Parliament and the Commission are truly at 
loggerheads. Once policymaking is turned over to administrators, therefore, 
Parliament has only limited powers to ensure that the same agenda that drove 
policy formation will also guide implementation.
^3 See Commission’s Undertaking of 26 September 1996, Budget Resolution of October 
1996; Modus Vivendi, 1996 OJ. (C 102) 1; Klepsch-Millan Agreement of 13 July 1993, 1993 
O.J. (C 255) 19; Plumb-Delors Agreement of 1988.
14 Modus Vivendi, 1996 O.J. (C 102) 1, at 1-2.
For instance. Parliament can put the Commissions funding in reserve subject to the 




























































































Somewhat counter to popular perception, the Council is not much better 
situated than Parliament to hold Community administration accountable. Even 
though experts on comitology committees are supposed to represent their 
member states, national executives are hard-pressed to control the work of their 
experts. Domestically, even if ministry employees were to favor, say, a tough 
environmental regulation that imposed considerable costs on industry, they 
could expect to face opposition from political appointees mindful of party 
politics (and industry’s clout within the party). The very same civil servants, 
even though they might be sent with strict instructions, once in Brussels decide 
matters with other environmental policy experts collectively and, apart from the 
rare occasions upon which the Council is called upon to intervene, without any 
direct political supervision. They are, therefore, more likely to consider the 
environmental protection goal as paramount, at the expense of other, legitimate 
policy objectives. National executives are even less able to monitor and control 
rulemaking through their position in the Council. Because comitology 
committees rarely issue negative opinions, implementing measures are 
generally not sent to the Council for a different decision or veto. The risk, 
therefore, is a cozy partnership between the Commission and national experts 
that is accountable to neither the Parliament nor the Council.
Implementing rules also do poorly on the fairness count. The process is 
secret. Those affected by rules only learn of them officially at the time of 
adoption when they must be published in the Official Journal. Aside from the 
statement of legal basis and the summary description of reasons that accompany 
the final rule, interested parties have no way of knowing the objectives, 
considerations, and alternatives that informed the policy choice. A rulemaking 
record exists - the Commission proposal and minutes of committee meetings - 
but it is not subject to mandatory disclosure. And even if interested parties were 
fully informed, they would have no right to participate in the administrative 
process and only rarely, in enforcement proceedings, would they be able to 
challenge rules in court. The main channel for participating in rulemaking - 




























































































II. The Rationale for a Comparative Study of American and 
Community Administrative Law
American law can serve as a source of ideas for Community administrative 
reform. In this instance the law of the member states does not offer much 
guidance because of the fundamental difference between parliamentary systems 
and the Community political order. In parliamentary systems, in what is known 
as party government, power is concentrated in the executive. The party or 
coalition of parties that captures the majority of seats in parliament forms the 
government and the government, in turn, commands the state bureaucracy. The 
same party or group of parties controls both parliament and the government and 
therefore even though separation of powers theory would have parliaments 
legislate and governments execute, in practice the two functions tend to blur. 
Parliamentary majorities not only pass laws but also keep an eye on 
implementation through their relationship with the executive and, vice versa, 
the government not only executes the law but also proposes legislation and 
pushes it through parliament.
By contrast, in the Community and the United States power is shared 
among independent branches of government. 16 In the Community, each branch 
of government draws its authority from a separate source: the Commission is 
staffed by civil servants and led by Commissioners under a duty to pursue the 
Community’s supranational mission, members of Parliament are directly 
elected, and the bureaucrats, ministers, and heads of government in the Council 
are selected nationally. Legislative power is divided among all three. The 
Commission proposes and the Council and Parliament decide (Council voting 
rules and Parliament’s role vary according to policy area). Likewise, under the 
U.S. Constitution each branch of government answers to a different 
constituency and represents different interests. Members of the House are 
directly elected every two years on a one-person-one-vote basis and are 
supposed to most directly represent local constituent interests; Senators are 
elected every six years in state-wide elections and are supposed to represent 
state interests; the President is selected in a nationwide election, national 
recognition originally thought to guarantee that only well-respected statesmen 
would serve in the office. A statute must be passed by both Houses and signed 
into law by the President.
16 On the American system, see Jones, C. O. (1997) “The American Presidency” in Von 
Mettenheim, K. (ed.) Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics, Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press, at 23-26. Although the American system is often characterized as 
presidential, that label tends to overemphasize the executive’s authority. See Von Beyme, K. 
(1987) America as a Model, Aldershot, Gower, at 59. Independent branches and shared 




























































































The difference between parliamentary systems and, for lack of a better 
name, checks and balances systems, leads to very different bureaucratic design 
problems. First, as I develop in this section, accountability in parliamentary 
systems is accountability to only one actor - the majority party or coalition of 
parties that forms the government. Second, although interests initially have 
difficulty making themselves heard in the tightly knit community of party 
politicians and civil servants, once they do so they are assured a voice in 
policymaking from start to finish. By contrast, administrative accountability in 
checks and balances systems is accountability to multiple lawmakers. And 
interest group politics in such systems tend toward pluralism, meaning that 
many groups compete for a role in policy formation and must also have an 
opportunity to influence policy downstream, at the rulemaking phase. The 
common constitutional framework in the Community and the United States 
suggests that they face common bureaucratic design problems and therefore the 
American experience with the administrative state can contribute to the 
Community reform debate.
A. Accountability
Accountability is a classic principal-agent problem. 17 Speed, expertise, and 
fairness are among the advantages that lawmakers gain by giving bureaucracies 
power. As with all agents, however, the bureaucracy might not do its principal’s 
bidding and might neglect to carry out statutes as lawmakers intended. The 
legislative principal, therefore, uses various techniques to monitor and control 
bureaucrats. This is not only a question of what lawmakers typically do but 
what they are constitutionally obliged to do. A legislature that controls 
execution too carefully might violate separation of powers principles, but one 
that does not control enough might very well be charged with an 
unconstitutional abdication of its legislative powers because of the ease with 
which execution can become lawmaking. Thus the limits on delegation of 
powers enforced by national constitutional courts, the United States Supreme 
Court, and the European Court of Justice.
In parliamentary systems a single lawmaking principal exists - the party 
or coalition of parties that won the majority of seats in parliament and goes on 
to form the government - and controls state administration. Governments, not 
parliaments, are the key player in the bureaucratic control game because they 
are ideally located, by virtue of their central position in both legislative politics 
and the administration, to ensure that the same political agenda that drove
U  See McCubbins, M.D., Noll, R.G., and Weingast, B.R. (1987) "Administrative Procedures 





























































































lawmaking will also guide implementation. 18 The civil servants who staff a 
ministry answer, through a hierarchical chain of command, to the minister, 
cabinet, prime minister, and majority party or coalition of parties. When it 
comes time to draft rules, therefore, bureaucrats are supervised by the same 
politicians who crafted the policy line laid down in the enabling statute. 
Accountability is achieved largely through the informal politics of government 
guidance, monitoring, and punishment.
Parliaments and courts take a backseat to governments in assuring 
accountability in parliamentary systems. Parliaments wield a number of 
institutional tools to keep the administration in check (e.g. parliamentary 
questions, calls for resignation, and the power of veto or amendment of 
executive rules) but, on the whole, these tools are weak and parliaments do not 
make heavy use of them. Courts also play a secondary role in making sure 
bureaucracies do lawmakers’ bidding. 19 Although national differences abound, 
courts generally only police for departures from statutory commands, and 
flagrant ones at that, because they assume that administrators will be kept on a 
tight leash by governments.
Methods of holding administration accountable in parliamentary systems 
offer little guidance for the Community. There two independent branches, 
Council and Parliament, pass legislation and both must control implementation, 
entrusted to yet a third independent branch, the Commission. American 
institutions, however, can contribute to the Community administrative reform 
debate because in the United States as well a dual lawmaking principal must 
hold the administration accountable. In the Constitution, the power to legislate 
is entrusted to Congress and the President but the power to execute the law is 
given to the President acting alone. Accountability to two principals. Congress 
and the President, is a recurring theme in American administrative law. 
Congress constantly seeks to control implementation or, at the very least, 
loosen the President’s hold over the administration with oversight hearings, the 
Congressional Budget Office and General Accounting Office, independent 
agencies, and a series of other techniques. When Congress delegates 
rulemaking power in a piece of legislation it attempts to retain control by 
writing in statutory “hammers” and “citizen-suit provisions.” (A hammer sends 
into effect undesirable, from the point of view of regulated industry, provisions 
if the agency fails to act by a certain date; citizen-suit provisions entitle 
members of the public to sue agencies to force them to take regulatory action.)
See generally Wilson, J.Q. (1989) Bureaucracy, New York, Basic Books, at 295-312.
19 See generally Stroink, F. (1995) "Judicial control of the administration’s discretionary 
powers (le bilan executif--judge administratif)” in Bakker, R., Heringa, A.W., Stroink, F. 
(eds.) Judicial Control, Antwerpen, Maklu, 81-99; Craig, P.P. (1994) Administrative Law, 




























































































And, most important for this paper, some have argued that Congress (as well as 
the President) uses administrative procedure and judicial review to control 
agency rulemaking.
B. Interest Group Participation
Governments involve interest groups in policy implementation, including 
rulemaking, for a variety of reasons. As 1 argued above, it is indispensable to 
the fairness of the process. Those who will be expected to comply with rules as 
well as those who stand to benefit should have the opportunity to tell 
administrators how they believe they will be affected and express their views. 
Interest groups also contribute valuable information to rulemaking. They and 
their members can be expected to have considerable experience in the field and 
therefore can inform administrators as to the nature and extent of the regulatory 
problem as well as the expected costs and benefits of various regulatory 
options.20 To return to the definition of good administration offered at the 
outset of the paper, interest groups add to expertise in bureaucratic 
decisionmaking. Of course, some of the information that they make available is 
slanted, but administrators can handle the problem by taking the information 
with the necessary grain of salt. Further, through their relationship with 
members, access to the media, and legislative lobbying activities, interest 
groups contribute to public debate on regulatory issues and therefore render 
bureaucrats more accountable to the general public.21 Finally, interest group 
participation can improve compliance. To the extent that interest organizations 
command the loyalty of their members, their inclusion in the rulemaking 
process gives some assurance that their members will acquiesce in agency 
policy choices.
The degree to which interests influence policy implementation as well as 
the form that participation takes vary greatly across Western Europe.22 As a 
consequence of the strong, unitary nature of government in most parliamentary 
systems, however, interests must win insider status within the policy 
community of party politicians and civil servants, after which they are 
informally consulted on everything from major legislative proposals to
20 See Schuck, P. (1997) "Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise o f Factions", Yale 
Law and Policy Review, 15, 2, 553-597, at 583-586.
21 See id. at 580-583.
22 French government is generally characterized as closed to interest influence and ready to 
impose policy choices upon social groups; German government as open to interest groups and 
anxious to obtain social consensus; and Great Britain as somewhere in between. See 




























































































technical implementing rules.23 Note two features of this system of interest 
group participation. First, state actors can and do wield a heavy hand in 
selecting which interests will have a say in policymaking. Second, the same set 
of party politicians and civil servants are responsible for policy formulation and 
implementation and therefore once an interest group is recognized as 
legitimate, it is relatively sure of access to policymaking from start to finish. 
Formal guarantees that interests will have a voice in policymaking downstream 
at the rulemaking phase, namely legal procedures, are unnecessary.
The relationship between interest groups and government is far less 
orderly in the Community and tends towards the pluralist model.24 First, in a 
constitutional system of independent branches and shared power, agreement as 
to which interests should be consulted is difficult to achieve and therefore more 
groups participate in policymaking. This is especially the case where 
policymakers come out of different national traditions of interest 
representation. Second, without a system of strong parties and central 
administration, the interests that influence policy formulation are not assured
23 The most extreme form of this type of interest representation is neo-corporatism. 
Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden are considered neo-corporatist states, meaning that 
government both privileges certain interests and relies heavily on those interests in policy 
formulation and implementation. Philippe Schmitter, the well-known political scientist 
credited as one of the first to analyze the return in Europe to corporatist forms of state-society 
relations in the 1970s, has developed a handy definition:
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non­
competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally predetermined categories, 
recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain govemmentally imposed controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports.
Schmitter, P.C. (1974) "Still the Century of Corporatism?", Review of Politics, 36, 85, 93-94.
24 See, e.g., Greenwood, J. and Aspinwall, M. (1998) "Conceptualising Collective Action in 
the European Union" in Greenwood, J. and Aspinwall, M. (eds.) Collective Action in the 
European Union, London, Routledge, 1-30, at 2. Here I borrow another convenient definition 
from Schmitter:
Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into an unspecified number o f multiple, voluntary, 
competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of 
interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created 
or otherwise controlled by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of 
representational activity within their respective categories.




























































































access to policy implementation. The Commission alone, supervised only 
loosely by the Council and even less so by the Parliament, is charged with 
rulemaking and therefore the interests that had a say in the lawmaking process 
through a national minister or a European parliamentarian, will not necessarily 
have one in implementation.
Here again the American political system contains important parallels. 
Interest representation in the United States is considered the prototype of 
pluralism.25 A wide array of interest groups compete for influence in a 
fragmented political system that contains many points of access—members of 
Congress, the President, political parties, and the federal administration. They 
influence lawmaking by shaping public opinion, making contributions to 
powerful members of Congress, the President, and political parties, and 
delivering votes. When it comes time for policy implementation, they use 
politics as well as legal procedure to shape outcomes. The United States, 
therefore, serves as one example of how a pluralist system can guarantee 
interest group participation when policymaking is turned over to regulators.
III. American Rulemaking
A. The Basic Framework
The standards governing agency procedure and judicial review in an American 
rulemaking proceeding are to be found in the Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946 (APA), the specific statute being implemented, and administrative case 
law. The most important APA provisions are the following:
(b) General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in 
the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and 
either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in 
accordance with law. The notice shall include—
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule 
making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is 
proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making 
through submission of written data, views or arguments with or




























































































without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of 
the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the 
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and 
purpose.26
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning 
or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing 
court shall—
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege 
or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
. . .  .27
These provisions contain a number of critical features. First, the public must be 
informed of the rule through publication in the official government journal, the 
Federal Register (notice). Second, interested individuals may submit comments 
in which they marshal data, opinions, and legal arguments in favor or against 
the proposed rule (comment). Third, the agency must briefly justify the rule, 
setting out the regulatory problem it is intended to address and the 
considerations that led to its adoption (statement of basis and purpose). Finally, 
courts are to catch administrators who transgress the outer limits of their 
statutory mandates and regulate when not authorized to do so and are to strike 
unconstitutional or arbitrary and capricious rules.
Although the APA is the essential backdrop in any rulemaking 
proceeding, the starting point is the statute conferring regulatory authority upon 
an agency in that instance. The relationship between the APA and enabling 
legislation is easy to understand if the statute is silent as to rulemaking 
procedure because the APA operates as a default rule. The intersection of the 
two is also straightforward where, as is more often the case, the legislation 
independently sets down agency procedure and a judicial review standard but 
the APA is repeated word for word or incorporated by reference. Only when the
26 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) ("Rulemaking").




























































































statute departs from the APA scheme does a difficulty arise. Many laws passed 
in the 1970s require rulemaking agencies to go through additional procedural 
hoops such as oral, trial-type hearings and impose higher burdens of proof such 
as judicial review for "substantial evidence on the record as a whole" or review 
for "clear and convincing evidence. "28 To come full circle, however, even when 
APA procedure is supplanted by statute the APA conceptual framework 
(developed, as we shall see, in the case law) is so powerful that usually 
rulemaking still follows the APA course.
B. The Evolution of Rulemaking from its Beginnings to the Present Day
The APA rulemaking provisions, as originally drafted, favored New Deal 
government activism.29 They trod lightly upon agency decisionmaking power. 
Notice of the proposed rule, an opportunity for comment, and the statement of 
basis and purpose accompanying the final rule were designed to guarantee 
openness in the policymaking process. The judiciary was to ensure that agency 
rules were constitutional (as with all government action) and that they did not 
fly in the face of reason. Courts were not to delve too deeply into a plausible 
agency explanation to check the facts and logic.
In the 1960s, agency rulemaking was transformed. The standard modus 
operandi of the prototype New Deal agencies, adjudication, fell out of favor for 
a number of reasons.30 Most important for our purposes was a change in public 
perception of administration and experts. Expertise at the service of public ends 
came to be perceived as more complicated than a statutory instruction to an 
agency to solve a given problem.3i In a number of cases, the experts seemed to 
act not in the public good but in the interests of the industry they were 
supposed to be regulating. It thus appeared that decades of agency interaction 
with industries, an unavoidable part of the regulatory task, had transformed a 
once adversarial relationship into a cozy partnership ("agency capture"). 
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the administrative state had fallen prey to a 
general decline in confidence in science and, more broadly speaking, the 
possibility of objective, impartial knowledge. It was no longer possible to 
believe that advances in technology were inevitably tied to progress when they 
had led to pollution, atomic weapons, and other problems. Thus, went the view,
28 Rulemaking that must, by statute, satisfy these more demanding procedural and 
substantive standards is known as hybrid rulemaking.
29 See generally Shapiro, M. (1988) Who Guards the Guardians, Athens, University of 
Georgia Press, at 36-77.
20 See generally Pierce, Jr., R.J. (1996) “Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act”, 
Tulsa Law Journal, 32, 2, 185-201.
21 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 29, at 62-73; Ackerman, B.A. and Hassler, W.T. (1981) 




























































































experts routinely made judgment calls with significant normative ramifications 
and society, not the experts, had to somehow control those decisions.
Public law reformers thought that rulemaking could go a long way in 
remedying these defects. Agency action would be more public-spirited because 
rulemaking, unlike adjudication, was a process open to all, rendering 
administrators accountable to the entire community and not simply firms with a 
high financial stake in the outcome.32 They promoted rulemaking, over- 
optimistically as I shall discuss later, as the primary institutional means by 
which administrators were to solve contemporary social problems. This new 
mission for rulemaking led to dramatic changes in how it operated. Agencies 
had to solicit and incorporate the views of a variety of groups that previously 
had been excluded from the administrative process. Courts had to police 
rulemaking to protect against regulatory capture and ensure that proceedings 
were accessible and responsive to the public.
As courts took on their new role, the character of judicial review changed 
considerably and it is this framework, formally based on the APA text from 
1946 but developed in the case law of the 1970s, that still stands today.33 As 
before, courts reviewed rules for constitutional violations, agency action that 
went beyond what was authorized in the statute, and misinterpretation of 
statutory text guiding agency action. Unlike the past, however, when courts 
were called upon to decide whether rules were arbitrary and capricious, they 
showed themselves far more willing to get into the technical merits of agency 
policy choices and carefully scrutinize the rationale offered for such decisions. 
Courts had to be satisfied that agencies had considered and adequately 
answered the challenges put forward by rulemaking participants. Patricia Wald, 
a judge on the federal court of appeals that handles the overwhelming majority 
of rulemaking cases, describes the variety of complaints that masquerade 
behind the deceptively simple claim that a rule is "arbitrary and capricious":
"Arbitrary and capricious" has turned out to be the catch-all label for attacks 
on the agency’s rationale, its completeness or logic, in cases where no 
misinterpretation of the statute, constitutional issue or lack of evidence in the 
record to support key findings is alleged. Frequently the arbitrary and 
capricious charge is grounded on the complaint that the agency has departed 
from its prior rationale in other cases without admitting it or explaining why. 
Sometimes the agency is rebuffed because it did not give adequate 
consideration to an alternative solution. But most often the court simply finds
32 See Stewart, R.B. "The Reformation of American Administrative Law", Harvard Law 
Review, 88, 8, 1667-1813 (1975); Mashaw, J.L. (1997) Greed, Chaos, and Governance, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, at 22-23.
33 See generally Mashaw, J.L. and Harfst, D.L. (1990) The Struggle for Auto Safety, 




























































































the agency’s explanation for what it is doing "inadequate." . . .  In a surprising 
number of cases, the court is most frustrated about the agency’s failure to 
communicate any reason for taking certain actions.34
Part of this willingness to roll up sleeves and get mired in policy debates 
was the need for an extensive agency record. Without a written record (and in 
the absence of independent fact-finding) courts could not evaluate whether 
attacks on agencies’ scientific evidence and policy analysis had any merit. 
Agencies, therefore, were required to compile a contemporaneous record that 
included the scientific evidence and reasoning that served as the foundation for 
the agency rule and justified setting aside the other options advocated by notice 
and comment participants.
At the same time standing was liberalized, expanding the class of 
litigants entitled to challenge agency rules.35 Previously, litigants had to show 
that they had a legal right specifically protected by the regulatory statute at 
issue to challenge agency action. Under a Supreme Court case decided in 1970, 
anyone who fell "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute" was allowed into court, and allowed into court not to 
protect individual legal rights but as a "reliable private attorney general to 
litigate the issues of the public interest in the present case."36 Congress also had 
a hand in liberalizing standing. Many of the regulatory statutes enacted in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s ("citizen-suit provisions") permitted anyone to 
challenge agency action on the theory that they would serve as private attorneys 
general, protecting the public interest in the correct application of the law.
Quite obviously, the more active role that courts took on in policing the 
rulemaking process fed back into and altered the very nature of that process. 
Constructing an agency record that would hold up in court did not simply entail 
more paper and ink but required more extensive and accessible (to the non­
expert judge) fact-finding and reasoning from the very beginning. Before an 
agency could even publish notice of a proposed rule it had to document the 
need for regulatory change and the nature of the different policy options 
through surveys, scientific studies, and consultation with the regulatory 
community. Agencies could not rely as extensively on the quick and 
convenient, but occasionally inaccurate, rules of thumb and informal 
information gathering techniques that they had used in the past.
34 Wald, P.M. (1996) "Judicial Review in Midpassage", Tulsa Law Journal, 32, 2, 221-258, 
at 233-234.
35 See Shapiro, supra note 29, at 45-46.




























































































IV. A Case Study on Notice and Comment: Waste Regulation
A. The Statutory Scheme
To illustrate the American system of rulemaking I take an example from the 
environmental field. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(RCRA), significantly amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments of 1984, is the environmental statute that governs the handling of 
waste in the United States.37 Under the RCRA, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has primary responsibility for regulating hazardous waste while 
the states are delegated responsibility for non-hazardous waste.38 All of the 
rulemaking provisions require that the EPA undertake a notice and comment 
proceeding before promulgating rules. For instance, the provision directing the 
EPA to draw up two types of hazardous waste lists, one which identifies the 
characteristics that waste must display to be considered hazardous and the other 
which identifies hazardous waste by name, says that regulations shall be 
promulgated "after notice and opportunity for public hearing. "39 Moreover, the 
statute contains a catch-all provision that requires the EPA to proceed through 
notice and comment whenever it promulgates regulations:
Public participation in the development, revision, implementation, and 
enforcement of any regulation, guideline, information, or program under this 
Act shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the [EPA] 
Administrator and the States. The [EPA] Administrator, in cooperation with 
the States, shall develop and publish minimum guidelines for public 
participation in such processes.40
Finally, the statute requires that whenever a state acts in lieu of the EPA that it 
follow the same notice and comment procedures.4i Thus even when a state 
instead of the EPA is responsible for implementation, the public is guaranteed 
the same level of participation.
Judicial review of EPA rules is expressly guaranteed under the RCRA. 
Courts are directed to follow the standards set out in the Administrative 
Procedure Act, namely arbitrary and capricious review, subject to certain
37 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (1994).
38 The EPA is a federal executive agency, meaning among other things that the administrator 
(agency head) is appointed and removed at will by the President. Most o f the policymaking 
occurs at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. whereas enforcement is carried out by its ten 
regional offices, which work closely with the states.
39 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(1) (1994).
40 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(1) (1994).




























































































exceptions that are irrelevant here.42 Before a plaintiff may challenge an EPA 
regulation, a number of conditions applicable in administrative litigation 
generally must be satisfied. The litigant must have exhausted her administrative 
remedies or else risk a finding that she has waived her rights. Further, the party 
must demonstrate that she satisfies constitutional and prudential standing 
requirements. More specifically, to fulfill the constitutional part of the test she 
must show that she has suffered concrete injury, that such injury is traceable to 
the complained of event, and that it is redressable through judicial action;43 to 
satisfy the prudential part, she must show that she falls within the "zone of 
interests" that Congress intended to regulate or protect with the RCRA.44 
Lastly, even though rules may be challenged prior to enforcement, the suit must 
still be "ripe," a two-part inquiry that takes into account the "fitness of the 
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration."45 Whereas exhaustion, and to a lesser extent, standing, can 
operate as barriers to judicial review in rulemaking cases, ripeness very rarely is 
an obstacle.
B. Rulemaking
In 1991, pursuant to its RCRA mandate, the EPA promulgated the Burning of 
Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces Rule (BIF Rule). Existing 
regulation had already placed controls on incinerators that burned hazardous 
waste for purposes of waste treatment and disposal. The BIF Rule added to the 
pre-existing framework by extending the regulatory net to industrial boilers and 
furnaces that used hazardous waste for fuel recovery purposes. Facilities 
treating hazardous waste in this fashion were among the last to be regulated 
because of the obvious benefits from using hazardous waste as fuel. Hazardous 
waste is cheap compared to fossil fuels. In addition, combustion can destroy 
waste’s dangerous chemical compounds thus treating it and using it for its fuel 
value at one and the same time. Yet there exists a significant risk that 
dangerous chemical compounds will not be fully destroyed and that, when they 
react with other fuels used in the process, even more toxic substances will 
result. The rule eventually promulgated attempted to strike a balance between 
these two sets of competing considerations.
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a) (1994).
42 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
44 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
42 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 386 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). Fitness for review includes 
consideration of whether the issues can be classified as legal or factual, the former lending 




























































































In May 1987, the EPA published notice of a proposed rule and request 
for comment.46 Although it is common to give warning with an advanced notice 
of proposed rulemaking, the EPA had already issued a regulation imposing 
notification requirements on hazardous waste bumers47 and had indicated 
almost two years earlier that it planned to introduce a permitting system.48 Thus 
the proposed rule came as no surprise to the regulated community.
The notice contained several parts. First it laid out the Agency’s statutory 
authority to promulgate the rule and described the environmental and safety 
hazards caused by the burning of hazardous waste in boilers and industrial 
furnaces, making a case for the need for regulation. Then the notice discussed 
and justified a number of critical policy choices made by the Agency in drafting 
the rule, among which figured the decision to base controls on national 
performance standards rather than on case-by-case risk assessments. It also set 
out in detail the controls that the EPA proposed for emission of toxic organic 
compounds, toxic metals, and hydrogen chloride and the risk assessment 
methodology the Agency had used to calculate the controls, including the 
decision to set limits so as to ensure that the increased lifetime risk of 
developing cancer from direct inhalation of carcinogenic stack emissions would 
not exceed one in 100,000. Throughout this discussion and in a separate section 
at the end of the proposal, the EPA estimated what it thought would be the 
costs of compliance, the economic impact of such costs on the profitability of 
the industry as a whole and on individual plants, and the reduction in the risk of 
cancer to exposed individuals. Although this information was mandated by an 
executive order on regulatory impact statements49 and a Congressional statute 
concerning small businessesso it is safe to assume that even in their absence, 
agencies would need to develop some of the same information when explaining 
and justifying the regulatory approach chosen upon review in court.
The public was given two months to submit comments. On top of 
soliciting comments generally, at various points during the discussion of the 
proposed rule the EPA asked for comments on specific issues such as the 
approach to take to toxic organic compound emissions standards. It also 
announced that three public hearings would be held in different spots around 
the country. Persons wishing to make a statement were directed to inform the 
EPA, to restrict oral presentations to 15 minutes, and to come with written
46 Burning of Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,982 (May 
6, 1987).
47 Burning of Hazardous Waste Fuels and of Fuels Derived from Used Oil, 50 Fed. Reg. 
49,164 (November 29, 1985).
48 50 Fed. Reg. 49,192 (November 29, 1985).
49 Executive Order 12,291, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note (1988).




























































































copies of their comments for inclusion in the official record. Further, after 
notice was issued the EPA conducted negotiations with various industry 
representatives.
Two years later, in October 1989, the EPA published a supplement to the 
proposed rule.51 It contemplated several revisions to the proposed rule, many of 
which were provoked by comments. First, it had received numerous comments 
suggesting the need for a control on particulate emissions. This was based on 
the fear that toxic metals and organic compounds might be absorbed onto 
particulate matter which might itself pose a health risk because of the ease with 
which it is inhaled and absorbed by the lungs. Therefore, even though the EPA 
thought that this risk was already covered by another regulatory scheme, it 
proposed to apply the particulate standard currently in use for hazardous waste 
incinerators to boilers and industrial furnaces. Second, the Agency responded to 
comments from boiler and cement kiln operators claiming that it would be 
impossible to comply with the control set for toxic organic compounds. It 
proposed an alternative standard to "avoid major economic impacts on the 
regulated community." Third, the Agency set down what it considered to be the 
scope of its statutory authority to regulate facilities that burned both fossil fuels 
(not covered by the RCRA by virtue of the Bevill Amendment, about which 
more shall be said later) and hazardous waste. This was an issue that had been 
addressed only marginally in the initial proposal but evoked reactions from the 
regulated industry in the comments and thus occupied a significant portion of 
the supplement.
Again the EPA issued a general call for comments on the changes and in 
addition, at specific points in the discussion, asked for the public’s reaction. As 
before, the public had two months to respond and the Agency conducted 
negotiations with industry and trade groups.52 In April 1990, the EPA 
published a second and minor supplement to the proposed rule53 and in 
February 1991, almost four year after the initial proposal, the final rule was 
promulgated.54 The final rule included a few modifications but most of the 
significant changes had already been made between the proposed rule and first 
supplement.
51 Burning of Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,718 
(October 26, 1989).
52 See, e.g., Peggy Abrahamson, EPA-Proposed Changes Cause Concern at AMC, American 
Metal Market, November 16, 1989, at 2.
53 Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Incinerators and Burning of 
Hazardous Wastes in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,862 (April 27, 1990).
54 Burning of Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces, 56 Fed. Reg. 7,134 (1991) 
(codified as amended by subsequent corrections and technical amendments at 40 C.F.R pt. 





























































































In Horsehead Resource Development Co. v. Browner55 a number of firms, 
industry associations, and environmental groups challenged the rule. They 
objected on a number of grounds: the EPA had misinterpreted the statutory 
provisions at issue, had given inadequate notice of a portion of the rule, and 
had issued a rule that was arbitrary and capricious in parts.
The BIF Rule rested on RCRA § 3004(q) and an amendment to the 
RCRA known as the Bevill Amendment. The first directed the EPA to establish 
standards for facilities that bum fuel containing hazardous waste in order to 
"protect human health and the environment. "56 The second exempted waste 
generated from fossil fuel from the RCRA regulatory scheme.57 What the 
statute failed to address was the status of facilities that burned both fossil fuel 
and hazardous waste. The EPA adopted a policy under which only hazardous 
residues “significantly affected” by hazardous waste fuel would be caught by 
the regulatory scheme. Operators of facilities that gave off cement kiln dust and 
combustion residues, classified as exempt wastes under the Bevill Amendment, 
contested this policy. They argued that the Bevill exemption applied as long as 
some fossil fuel was burned, regardless of whether hazardous waste was also 
used to produce the cement kiln dust and combustion residues. The opposite 
camp—a coalition of environmental groups—claimed that all cement kiln dust 
and combustion residues produced from hazardous waste, no matter how small 
the quantity of waste, should be treated as hazardous. The court rejected both 
challenges and upheld the EPA’s interpretation. It applied the Supreme Court 
standard of review in cases involving agency statutory interpretation which 
directs courts to first assess whether the unambiguous meaning of the statute 
settles the question, and if not, to defer to reasonable agency constructions.58 
The court found that the RCRA did not clearly speak to the issue and that the 
EPA's decision to regulate only hazardous residues “significantly affected” by 
hazardous waste was reasonable.59
Another challenge, brought by operators of wet process kilns (a type of 
cement kiln) involved procedural APA rights. In the BIF Rule, carbon 
monoxide (CO) emission levels and total hydrocarbon (THC) emission levels 
are used to gauge how fully hazardous waste is destroyed in the combustion
55 16 F.3d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
56 42 U.S.C. §6924(q)(1994).
57 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(a) (1994).
58 Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).




























































































process.60 High CO and THC emissions indicate that the principal hazardous 
organic constituents in the waste fuel were only partially broken down in 
combustion. Left over are products of incomplete combustion, some of which 
are known carcinogens, others of which may be. In the rulemaking proceeding, 
wet kiln operators had complained that they could not comply, for reasons 
unrelated to environmental safety, with either the CO or the alternative THC 
standard, and in response the EPA added a third emissions standard that 
combined CO and THC limits and would be formulated on a case-by-case 
basis.
According to the wet kiln petitioners, they had not received adequate 
notice of and opportunity for comment on the third standard. The court agreed. 
It found that although the EPA had given notice that it was considering a site- 
specific standard for wet kilns, it had not suggested—in the proposed rule, the 
first supplement, or the second supplement—that it was contemplating a 
combined CO and THC baseline. The court explained that the adequacy of 
notice and opportunity for comment rests on the relationship between the 
proposed and the final rule: even though the "EPA undoubtedly has authority to 
promulgate a final rule that differs in some particulars from its proposed rule" 
the final rule must be "a logical outgrowth’ of the one proposed."6i This, it 
elaborated, entails a description of the subjects and issues that is sufficiently 
detailed to allow interested parties an opportunity for meaningful participation. 
Here the standards using CO and THC separately could be expected to operate 
differently from a standard that combined the two, and therefore without notice 
of the dual baseline, wet-kiln operators were not afforded an adequate 
opportunity for comment.
Last came an arbitrary and capricious challenge to the substance of the 
third standard tailored specifically for wet kilns. Wet kilns had proven 
troublesome because of their design. A wet kiln is a slightly inclined cylinder 
that rotates on its own axis. The raw material (e.g. clay, shale, limestone) is 
poured into the top end and, as it slides down the kiln, is heated to very high 
temperatures. The kiln is powered by a furnace at the bottom end that can use 
powdered coal, other fossil fuel, or hazardous waste. Since carbon monoxide 
and hydrocarbons are generated by the raw materials poured into the top end 
and the furnace at the bottom end and since, due to wet kiln design, it is 
impossible to tell which of the emissions comes from the raw material and 
which from the furnace, wet kilns that burned negligible quantities of 
hazardous waste still ran the risk of exceeding the Rule’s CO and THC controls. 
Recognizing this problem, the EPA added a site-specific, combined CO/THC
60 The THC emissions standard was added after the first round of comments.




























































































emissions standard that it maintained would not pose compliance difficulties 
for environmentally sound wet kilns.
Petitioners contended that there was no rational basis for this conclusion. 
The issue turned on whether it was possible to calculate site-specific "non- 
hazardous" fuel emissions baselines that operators could be required to stick to 
when they burned hazardous fuel. The EPA pointed to two pieces of the record 
in support of its position. First, it argued that the results of test runs on a single 
wet kiln in Hannibal, Missouri showed that THC emissions were quantifiable 
and indeed decreased when hazardous waste was burned. The court examined 
the test bum results and found that, rather, they showed that combustion 
emissions depended entirely on the raw material used and thus rendered a 
reliable baseline impossible. Indeed at oral argument, EPA counsel admitted 
that the Hannibal test runs had been conducted for a different purpose and 
could not be used to support the wet kiln standard. Second, the EPA pointed to 
comments saying that, when hazardous waste was burned, hydrocarbon levels 
did not increase, thus making a "non-hazardous" THC baseline feasible. The 
court held that such evidence was inadequate because it did not deal with the 
CO component of the baseline. It concluded:
The agency thus had no information on this issue and was relying on pure 
speculation when it decided that a standard of no increase of CO and THC 
over quantifiable CO and THC baselines was achievable. Such speculation is 
an inadequate replacement for the agency’s duty to undertake an examination 
of the relevant data and reasoned analysis; thus the EPA’s action in 
promulgating the . . . standard was arbitrary and capricious.62
V. Assessing Notice and Comment
The principal features of American rulemaking are readily apparent from the 
hazardous waste example. First, the rulemaking proceeding and judicial review 
generated considerable information about the BIF Rule. Just from reading the 
proposed rule, first supplement, second supplement, final rule, and court 
opinion we have learned a lot about the science, efficiency considerations, 
industry costs, and health risks that went into choosing the BIF Rule as the 
means of ensuring that hazardous waste, when used as fuel, is burned safely. 
And it is not difficult to imagine the additional reams of paper and, presumably, 
information contained in a rulemaking record that includes EPA-commissioned 
scientific studies, comments from over thirty major participants, and individual 
responses to those comments.




























































































Second, a variety of interests had a say in rulemaking. The hydrocarbon 
standard was added (in the first supplement) as an alternative regulatory 
solution to the hazardous organic compound problem because firms in the 
cement kiln industry complained that, even though their emissions were not 
necessarily hazardous, it would be impossible for them to comply with the 
carbon monoxide standard. The EPA also listened to those concerned that the 
initial proposal was not protective enough of human health: it added a control 
on particulate emissions. In court, both industry representatives and 
environmental protection groups challenged the regulation, the former arguing 
for a more restrictive interpretation of the EPA’s regulatory authority, the latter 
for a broader one.
Finally, the judiciary played an active role in policing rulemaking. When 
the governing statute was ambiguous or failed to address the question at hand, 
the Horsehead court carefully examined the EPA’s regulatory choices for 
reasonableness. It analyzed the organic compound emissions standards to 
ensure that the agency had, in actual fact, given notice. And it picked through 
the record, checking the evidence pointed to by the EPA in support of the third 
emissions standard, to decide the “arbitrary and capricious” claim. In sum, the 
court forced the agency to explain its decision in terms comprehensible to the 
general public and answer objections from rulemaking participants.
Information, interest participation, and extensive judicial review are the 
principal characteristics of American rulemaking. These features of the system 
are inextricably linked: more information about a rule lays the groundwork for 
interest group critique and thorough judicial review; interest groups generate 
information because of their familiarity with the industry and their strong 
incentives to contest or promote agency action, which in turn permits more 
extensive court scrutiny; and tough judicial review feeds back into expectations 
as to how much information must be provided by agencies and how seriously 
rulemaking participants' objections and suggestions must be taken.
In this section I return to the values important to good administration 
identified earlier in the paper—accountability, fairness, expertise, speed—and 
see how American rulemaking fares. I draw on the voluminous academic 
literature on notice and comment to argue that it improves accountability to 
lawmakers and allows significant room for interest participation. On a less 
positive note, I discuss claims that notice and comment gives too much say to 
special interests and slows down the pace of rulemaking.
A. Accountability
American administrative procedure and judicial review render bureaucrats 




























































































President use notice and comment to control rulemaking outcomes.63 Mathew 
McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, a team of political scientists, 
have explored the full range of techniques that Congress and the President 
(lawmaking principals) use to monitor, punish, and reward the federal 
bureaucracy (the agent).64 Among these figures rulemaking procedure. First, 
the information generated in the course of rulemaking and judicial review 
enables lawmakers to keep tabs on agencies and react, if need be, before the 
rule goes into effect.65 Because a proposed rule is announced well in advance 
and the issues thoroughly fleshed out (by private actors with strong incentives 
to contest bureaucrats and courts that require explanation in language 
comprehensible to agency outsiders) in the lengthy process of comments, 
replies to comments, supplemental proposed rules, and judicial review, 
Congress and the President have ample time and information upon which to act. 
Second, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast argue that interest groups and courts 
function as third-party monitors in the principal-agent relationship between 
Congress and the President on the one hand and agencies on the other. By 
allowing the public to participate in agency rulemaking and bring court 
challenges, Congress and the President ensure that the coalition of interests that 
originally backed a piece of legislation will control its implementation as well. 
By giving courts the power to strike rules that deviate from enabling 
legislation, Congress secures agency adherence to legislative policy choices.
Congressional and Presidential control through administrative procedure 
is certainly not mathematic.66 Legislative aides are unlikely to read the Federal 
Register from cover to cover, time and circumstance may very well lead one 
coalition of interests to press for passage of a law and another one to support 
subsequent regulations, and courts tend to have a mind of their own, even 
though they work from statutory text and legislative history. An administrative 
process, however, that generates copious and intelligible public information 
about regulatory change and is open to interest groups who themselves have
63 Martin Shapiro argues that the only real masters in this principal-agent relationship are 
courts. See supra note 29, at 124. While there is some truth to this position, it neglects the 
limits that legal texts place on judicial interpretive options and the ability of political actors to 
influence rulemaking before courts appear on the scene.
64 See McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, supra note 17, at 243.
65 Many rules contain long lead times for compliance and therefore they may be reviewed in 
court before coming into effect, allowing political actors to react to issues raised in the course 
of the judicial proceedings.
66 See generally Mashaw, J.L. (1990) "Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, 
Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development”, Journal o f Law, Economics, and 
Organization, 6, Special Issue, 267-298, at 280-284. Mashaw criticizes principal-agent theory 
on the grounds that it is logically flawed, for the legislature does not necessarily have an 
interest in ensuring that the same coalition that supported legislation influences rulemaking 




























































































access to politicians is undoubtedly more accountable than one where 
information is scarce because secret or only available upon request and debate 
is limited to bureaucrats.
B. Interest Group Participation
Notice and comment allows for pluralist interest participation in rulemaking. In 
a system where lawmakers are fairly open to a variety of interest groups, an 
administrative process that legally guarantees participation and information 
ensures that those same, diverse interests will be included in policymaking once 
it is turned over to regulators removed from Congressional politics. And, as I 
argued earlier, such participation is critical. A role for interest groups in 
rulemaking contributes to fairness, improves the substantive quality of rules, 
adds to public accountability, and smoothes the road to compliance.
Many American scholars, however, do not take such a rosy view of 
public participation in notice and comment. According to so-called public 
choice scholars, interest groups politics in government administration can be 
harmful to the public good.67 This claim is related to the vociferous opposition 
wet kiln operators mounted to the BIF Rule. Although both industry and 
environmental protection groups took part in the EPA proceeding, business 
interests proved most difficult to accommodate and occupied a disproportionate 
share of the Agency’s and the court’s time. The first supplement to the proposed 
rule, in which the Agency answered the bulk of the comments, contained a little 
for everyone: particulate emissions standards for environmental interests and a 
new toxic organic emissions standard for business interests. The following four 
years, however, were spent dealing with complaints from cement kilns 
operators (especially the wet kiln subset) and other industry interests. Fewer 
than fifty-seven furnace operators and within that set a particularly obstinate 
group of six to ten wet kiln operators caused the bulk of the EPA’s worries.68 
And the extra time trying to find a regulatory solution that would make wet kiln 
operators happy, i.e. the third toxic organic compound emissions standard, was 
very likely spent with a view to fending off a successful challenge in court. In
67 For an overview of public choice scholarship see Mashaw, supra note 32. Another critique 
of American rulemaking which deserves more attention than allowed here by space 
constraints has been made by Donald Elliott, former general counsel to the EPA. He claims 
that real public participation, what he describes as "the kind of back and forth dialogue in 
which minds (and rules) are really changed" does not occur through notice and comment. See 
Elliott, E.D. (1992) “Re-Inventing Rulemaking", Duke Law Journal, 41, 6, 1490-1496, at 
1495.
68 See Burning of Hazardous Waste in Boilers and Industrial Furnaces, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,982 
(May 6, 1987) (regulatory impact analysis); Horsehead Resource Development Co. v. 




























































































other words, where the costs of regulation were especially concentrated 
interests mobilized against it.
Public choice scholars argue that interest groups such as the furnace 
operators, through their involvement in policymaking, appropriate public 
resources for private ends and thus are ultimately destructive of public welfare. 
The public choice critique came in response to the view, popular in the 1970s, 
that rulemaking embodies pluralist democracy.69 In this decidedly optimistic 
picture of interest participation in public life, a rulemaking proceeding is a 
mini-legislature in which debate generates widely accepted and mutually 
beneficial public policy. In contrast, public choice thinkers, drawing on the 
work of Mancur Olson and other members of the rational choice school, 
maintain that pluralist interest politics fail to generate administrative rules in 
the general welfare.70 Special interest coalitions, called special because they 
speak for a small group of firms or individuals and not for larger constellations 
such as consumers, benefit at the expense of the environmental protection, 
consumer welfare, and other public goals that, in theory, statutes and 
regulations are designed to accomplish.71 Groups with few members who stand 
to win or lose heavily from regulatory change are most likely to organize and 
put pressure on politicians and administrators because each single member has 
a significant stake in the outcome. By contrast, large groups are likely to be 
poorly organized because the same benefits and costs of regulatory change are 
spread thinly across a large membership and therefore individual members do 
not have the necessary incentive to contribute to the collective effort. 
Consequently, the argument goes, even though many of the ambitious statutes 
of the 1960s and 1970s were designed for groups of the large and diffuse 
variety (e.g. consumers and environmentalists) when one looks closely at the 
statutory text and the regulatory schemes developed to implement them, they 
tend to work to the advantage of small groups of business and regional 
interests. A number of empirical studies on agency regulation bear out the 
public choice hypothesis.72
69 This theory is widely accepted as Richard Stewart’s brainchild. See Stewart, supra note 32.
70 See Olson, M. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, New York, Schocken Books. For the 
more recent version of rational choice theory that takes a broader view of the costs and 
benefits of collective action, see Moe, T.M. (1980) The Organization of Interests: Incentives 
and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press.
71 George Stigler is considered one of the pioneers of the so-called “capture” theory of public 
regulation. See, e.g., Cohen, M.F. and Stigler, G.F. (1971) Can Regulatory Agencies Protect 
Consumers?, Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, at 
1-17.
72 See Bartel, A.P. and Thomas, L.G. (1985) "Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A 




























































































Even though the literature has generated a series of reform ideas that 
would transfer policymaking power to institutions less susceptible to special 
interest pressure, none is particularly convincing.73 The defects public choice 
identifies are endemic to politics and no one has, as of yet, convincingly argued 
that either Congress or the executive branch is better at fending off private 
interest demands. Moreover, the exceedingly dark view public choice takes of 
interest participation is unwarranted. Notwithstanding its predictions, 
legislative politics and administrative procedure are used by public interest 
groups as well as "special" ones.74 Further, public choice theory rests on the 
assumption that the public welfare, what special interests tend to thwart, may be 
determined absent reference to politics by summing up individual preferences 
and utilities and arriving at an optimal policy outcome. Such preferences and 
utilities, however, are themselves the product of a political process in which 
interest groups are vital participants.75 They represent their constituencies, 
which indeed may be broader than appearance would have it as in the case of 
firms and consumers interested in lower prices, strike unlikely coalitions with 
other, temporarily like-minded interest groups (e.g. firms that produce 
environmental technologies and the environmental lobby), and galvanize public 
opinion. Public life in a liberal democracy without interest groups is not only 
impossible but also undesirable.
C. Speed
1. The Critique
The slowness of American rulemaking is one of its main drawbacks. The four 
years it took the EPA to complete the BIF Rule (and that is not even counting 
the time used to draft the initial proposed rule) and the additional two years it 
took the court to hand down its decision are not at all uncommon. In this area of 
administrative law, the labels of choice are "ossification"76 and "gridlock."77
(1980) "The Effects o f Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flammability 
Standard", Journal of Law and Economics, 23, 2,461-479.
23 See Aranson, P.H., Gellhom, E. and Robinson, G.O. (1983) "A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation", Cornell Law Review, 68, 1, 1-67. These authors argue that Congress should take 
responsibility for rulemaking because special interest deals would occur in the light of day 
and therefore legislators would be held publicly accountable. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, Jerry Mashaw argues that administrators should retain rulemaking authority 
because they are responsible to the President and special interests wield less influence in the 
President’s nationwide constituency. See Mashaw, supra note 32, at 147-155.
2^ See Schuck, supra note 20, at 574-576.
25 See generally id. at 587-88. Schuck argues for a procedural conception of the public 
interest in which interest groups figure prominently.





























































































Fewer rules is not the only cost of slowness. To avoid rulemaking's 
cumbersome record-building requirements and tough judicial review, agencies 
sometimes resort to adjudicatory regulatory techniques such as product 
recalls.78 Yet adjudication can be an inefficient form of agency action and can 
cause uncertainty for the regulated community, violating rule of law principles. 
Rather than fostering openness and participation in administration, therefore, a 
sluggish rulemaking process may actually cause a return to unaccountable and 
arbitrary agency action.
By common agreement, courts and judicial review must take some of the 
blame for the snail’s pace at which rulemaking proceeds. Although the critical 
view has always been somewhat exaggerated and was probably truer in the 
1970s than at present, it nonetheless captures the relationship between tough 
judicial review and agency process. In response to each legal challenge, courts 
require that administrators point to a part of the rulemaking record where they 
entertained the objection but marshaled scientific evidence and policy 
arguments against it. Rulemaking, therefore, has turned into a protracted 
deliberation before agencies in which regulators must carefully document and 
explain rules so that, when hauled into court, they can mount a successful 
defense. Agencies bear an especially high burden of explanation because of the 
unpredictable quality of so-called "hard look" judicial review. They cannot be 
certain of which issues will appear salient to the group of three non-expert 
judges who review the rule and therefore the paper trail must cover the entire 
world of possible issues and non-issues, large and small. Consequently, 
rulemaking has become a long process of comments, agency answers, second- 
round comments, second-round agency answers, legal challenge, and, if the 
agency failed to do a thorough job, a court judgment remanding the rule to the 
agency for further explanation and development of the evidentiary record, or, 
albeit rarely, a judgment vacating the rule and forcing the agency to start from 
scratch.
2. Proposed Reforms
How can American administrative law be changed to ensure control without 
gridlock? Much of the reform debate centers on reducing the role for judicial 
review. One option is to relax the standard of review employed by courts. 
Another, proposed by Richard Pierce, an administrative law scholar, is that the 
judicial branch get out of the business of arbitrary and capricious review 
altogether and, by way of compensation, that the legislature exercise a veto 
power over rules.79 Lastly, Jerry Mashaw, the author of an influential case 
study on automobile regulation as well as a number of other works, argues that
77 Mashaw, supra note 32, at 203.
78 See Mashaw and Harfst, supra note 33, at 95-100, 161-163.




























































































the judicial burden can be lightened by changing the availability rather than the 
nature of review.80 Because fines for non-compliance only start running once a 
rule comes into effect (a regulation that requires large capital investments 
necessarily includes some lead time) and courts will generally review rules 
prior to enforcement, a firm that challenges a rule will only incur the cost of 
legal fees. This and a series of other considerations induce firms to litigate 
rather than comply, even though their legal claims may not be particularly 
strong. Mashaw argues that if review is delayed until after rules come into 
effect, so that the choice to litigate carries with it the extra cost of non- 
compliance fines, litigants will be less ready to tum to courts.
D. The Future of Rulemaking
Notwithstanding the debate surrounding notice and comment, it will remain an 
important part of the American administrative state. If anything, regulatory 
reformers in Congress appear to be interested in legislating more, not less, 
intrusive judicial review.81 To a certain extent, the excesses of the American 
system and the reluctance to do anything about them is symptomatic of a 
political system with fragmented legislative power and pluralist interest 
representation. Congress does not write the Environmental Defense Fund, the 
Chemical Manufacturers of America, and the courts out of rulemaking because 
it seeks to retain a modicum of control in the face of the President’s powerful 
position at the apex of the federal bureaucracy. Regulation at times can appear a 
thicket of special interest deals because a system of independent branches and 
shared powers is unable to wield a heavy hand in mediating interest group 
relations.82
The system’s flaws, however, are also a function of American attitudes 
towards experts and courts. Americans are, rightly or wrongly, highly skeptical 
of expertise.83 By contrast, they are confident that courts can guarantee
80 See Mashaw, supra note 32.
8* An amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act ("Bumpers Amendment") which 
would have introduced de novo judicial review of agency statutory interpretation, was 
proposed in 1979. S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 503 (1979). A significantly revised text 
was later passed by the Senate but died in the House of Representatives. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1981); see Shapiro, S.A. (1996) "Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of the APA: 
A Delegation Theory of the APA", Administrative Law Journal o f the American University, 
10, 1,89-109, at 103.
82 1 do not wish to overemphasize the difference between special interest power in pluralist 
as opposed to corporatist polities. What an umbrella organization may tout as a consensus 
position, say, one that mediates between small and big business, may simply be a patchwork 
of special interests that comes at the expense of the group's welfare as a whole.
83 See Wilson, supra note 18, at 295-312. This description of American attitudes toward 




























































































accountability in administration and promote the public welfare. True, in a 
democratic system of government, elected officials should make the policy 
decisions and unelected bureaucrats should carry them out. To understand the 
role of courts in American administrative law, however, this principal-agent 
relationship must be set against the larger principal-agent relationship that 
exists between the Constitution and all other government acts. In a familiar 
passage, Hamilton contrasts the Constitution, which he calls "the people 
themselves" with the legislature, a mere collection of "representatives of the 
people."84 One is the "principal" the other the "deputy," one the "master" the 
other the "servant."85 Hamilton therefore argues in favor of a judiciary separate 
from the legislative and executive branches that will be institutionally capable 
of defending the Constitution against the "fleeting passions of the people" that 
can be so powerful in electoral politics. And not simply one constitutional 
court, but both lower and higher, state and federal courts.
The part that courts play in rulemaking stems from this view of how 
government should be designed to foster the public good. Courts initially took 
on for themselves extensive powers of judicial review. Congress has continued 
to write statutes which contemplate discretionary agency action and strict 
judicial review, and academic commentators have continued to show faith in 
the ability of courts to review agency rules because of the place that courts 
occupy in the broader scheme of government. To be sure the Administrative 
Procedure Act is not the Constitution. Yet when a party comes to court and 
claims that a rule is arbitrary because it did not take into account elementary 
scientific principles or failed to respect the governing law, it is asking the court 
to undertake an inquiry similar to a constitutional challenge to a statute. Thus 
the court steps in as a co-equal branch of government, indeed perhaps in a 
stronger position than is normally the case because here it is not dealing with a 
government act passed by elected representatives but one that is the work of 
unelected bureaucrats. In a society where experts are distrusted and courts held 
in high regard it should come as no surprise that the public and courts play an 
important role in rulemaking.
Breyer, S. (1993) Breaking the Vicious Circle, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 
at 59-68; Schuek, P.H. (1987) Agent Orange on Trial, Cambridge. Mass., Belknap Press, at 
286-294.
84 Hamilton, A. (1992) “The Federalist No. 78” in Hamilton. A.. Madison, J., and Jay, J., The 





























































































VI. The Possible Impact of Notice and Comment on Community 
Rulemaking
A. Administrative Procedure
If the Community were to adopt notice and comment, the public would receive 
far more information about rules before adoption and would have a right to 
participate in rulemaking. To take the example of the Community’s hazardous 
waste legislation, identification and listing of hazardous waste is delegated to a 
regulatory committee filet procedure.86 The provision delegating authority to 
the Commission and a comitology committee would also require the 
Commission to publish its proposed measure in the Official Journal, solicit 
comments, and perhaps hold a public hearing. Thus the Commission would 
have to take into account scientific evidence on, say, waste toxicity submitted 
by businesses, environmental protection groups, and other interested parties. 
This on top of the evidence and advice already solicited from the Commission's 
expert group in the area (the Waste Committee) and the regulatory committee.87 
The same would be the case for the Council should the regulatory committee 
issue an unfavorable opinion and the Council be called upon to decide the 
matter. As a result, the regulated community and Parliament would have notice 
of implementing rules well before they were adopted. And not only would they 
know that a rule was in progress but they would be informed of the different 
regulatory approaches being considered and have a right to participate in the 
debate.
B. Locus Standi
If American standing rules were adopted as part of notice and comment reform, 
more parties would have access to the Court of Justice to challenge 
implementing rules. Currently, few may directly challenge implementing rules. 
Article 173, the Treaty provision which confers jurisdiction upon the Court to 
review Community acts, gives member states, the Council, and the Commission 
automatic locus standi. Parliament, however, may only bring suit if it can claim 
that its powers have somehow been violated, for instance if a Community act 
was passed without respecting the role set down for Parliament in the enabling 
Treaty provision. For individuals to gain access to the Court, the Community 
act must be of "direct and individual concern." This has been interpreted
86 Council Directive 91/689, 1991 O.J. (L 377) 20, art. 1.4.
87 See Demmke, C. (1997) "The Europeanization of Civil Services and the Role of National 
Civil Servants in the Decision-Making Process" in Demmke, C. (ed.) Managing European 
Environmental Policy: The Role of the Member States in the Policy Process, Maastricht, 





























































































narrowly by the Court as requiring that the act be intended to regulate a 
situation that specifically concerns the litigant.88 Consequently, those affected 
by implementing rules will generally be denied locus standi because, by their 
very nature, rules are written to regulate entire industries and benefit the public- 
at-large. Instead, prospective litigants must wait for the rule to be enforced 
locally and then challenge enforcement in their domestic courts on the grounds 
that the Community rule is invalid, at which point the court may refer the 
matter to the Court of Justice and obtain a preliminary ruling on the issue under 
Article 177. Not only is this procedure long, but it is highly contingent on 
national locus standi law which in some member states precludes challenges 
from public interest groups and others not directly involved in rule 
enforcement.89 To take the hazardous waste example again, more liberal locus 
standi rules would allow both waste producers and environmental groups 
access to the Court of Justice to challenge waste listings issued following the 
comitology procedure.
C. Judicial Review
Lastly, notice and comment would significantly change the nature of judicial 
review. Currently legal challenges to implementing rules come in three basic 
types. A litigant may oppose a rule on procedural grounds, arguing for instance 
that it was adopted without an adequate statement of reasons or the 
Commission failed to submit the measure to the apposite comitology committee 
for an opinion. Second, a litigant may complain that the measure contravenes or 
rests upon a flawed interpretation of a Treaty or statutory term. Third, a 
challenge may be based upon the claim that the evidence or reasoning that led 
to the rale’s adoption was flawed. The latter set of arguments can be framed in a 
variety of ways.90 Most on point is the claim that the Community institution 
committed a "manifest error of appraisal" when assessing the data and policy 
considerations. Or the litigant may complain that the measure violates the 
principle of proportionality, a means-ends test that finds its origins in German
88 For the Court’s most recent statement on standing, see Case C-321/95 P, Greenpeace v. 
Commission, April 2, 1998, para. 28.
89 The lack of uniform access of public interest litigants to national courts is widely 
recognized as problematic. See Rehbinder, E. (1996) ”Locus Standi, Community Law and the 
Case for Harmonization" in Hans Somsen (ed.) Protecting the European Environment: 
Enforcing EC Environmental Law, London, Blackstone Press, 151-166; Directive 98/27/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the 
protection of consumers'interests, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51.
90 s ee generally Cases C-157/96 and C-180/96, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food and United Kingdom v. Commission. May 5, 1998. In this case the Court 
upheld a Commission emergency measure banning export o f UK beef against challenges of 




























































































administrative law and may be invoked in any case involving a Community or 
member state act. In a recent restatement of the principle the Court explained:
[I]n order to establish whether a provision of Community law complies with 
the principle of proportionality, it must be ascertained whether the means 
which it employs are suitable for the purpose of achieving the desired 
objective and whether they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.91
The litigant would argue that a rule is technically flawed and therefore cannot 
solve the problem the legislator or administrator is attempting to address or is 
unduly burdensome, given the existence of other, less onerous policy options, 
and consequently is not proportionate to the stated objective of the rule.
Judicial review in rulemaking cases is narrow in scope.92 It is no great 
secret that the Court tends to be tough on national measures accused of 
violating the Treaties, Community legislation, or general principles of 
Community law and go easy on those issued by Community institutions.93 Take 
the way that the principle of proportionality is applied. Because national laws 
run the risk of operating as barriers to trade, the Court tends to engage in an 
exhaustive inquiry, carefully weighing a measure’s burden against its supposed 
aims and considering alternative, less cumbersome policy options. Community 
measures, which do not pose a threat to free trade, rarely run afoul of the 
proportionality principle.94 As between a Community legislative and
Case C-233-94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2405, para. 54.
92 See generally Joerges, C. (1996) Scientific Expertise in Social Regulation and the 
European Court of Justice: Legal Frameworks for Denationalized Governance Structures, 
EU1 Florence, RSC Working Paper no. 96/10.
93 See Dehousse, R. (1992) “The Legacy of Maastricht: Emerging Institutional Issues” in 
Collected Courses o f the Academy of European Law, 3, 1, 181-239, at 212. Dehousse 
describes the Court's leniency towards Community measures.
94 For instance, in Criminal Proceedings v. Wurmser, the Court found that a French law 
requiring importers to prove conformity of imported products with consumer protection rules 
would only be proportionate if it allowed importers to rely on means of proof normally 
available to them, e.g. certificates and attestations provided by the manufacturer as opposed to 
actual analysis of the product. Case 25/88, 1989 E.C.R. 1105. In Siidzucker Mannheim and 
Ochsenfurt AG and Hauptzollamt Mannheim, by contrast, the Court upheld a Commission 
common sugar market regulation imposing an economic penalty on traders failing to produce 
a specific Community certificate. The Court reasoned that other certificates could not 
substitute for the Community one because of the excessive administrative work such 
alternative means of proof would cause for member state authorities. Case C-161/96, January 
29, 1998. Similarly, in Kieffer and Thill, the Court upheld a Community regulation imposing 
certain information-collection obligations on firms involved in trading goods between the 
member states. The litigants claimed that such duties were burdensome and costly, especially 
for small and medium-sized enterprises, but the Court found the duties to be reasonable and 
held that the measure was a legitimate exercise of the Community legislature’s discretionary 




























































































administrative measure, however, the Court does not draw much of a 
distinction even though one is passed pursuant to the Treaty and therefore 
undergoes the full legislative process and the other follows an abbreviated 
procedure. The failure to distinguish between legislation and administrative 
acts is tied to the idea that regardless of which Community institution issues a 
measure, it can be trusted to protect against national parochialism and make the 
right, pro-Community policy choice.95
With notice and comment rulemaking, the Court would be called upon to 
enforce a wider array of procedural rights. Litigants could have the 
implementing rule annulled if the Commission failed to give adequate notice 
(remember Horsehead Resource Development Co. v. Browner) or did not give 
the public enough time to submit comments. Further, when conducting 
substantive review, the Court would be under more pressure to carefully 
consider the scientific and technical judgment calls made by the implementing 
body, for instance a claim that a type of waste was incorrectly listed as 
hazardous. Currently, without a public record of rulemaking proceedings, it 
cannot assess whether a decision was sound at the time it was made, and to the 
extent it wishes to engage in retrospective review, it must rely on the pleadings 
which are likely to contain unsubstantiated, ad hoc policy arguments. An 
administrative record of the type compiled in Horsehead Resource 
Development Co. v. Browner would give the parties stronger grounds for 
challenging scientific decisions and put the Court in a better position to 
evaluate such decisions. The litigants would be fully informed as to the policy 
calls made by the Commission and would already have had one shot, before the 
Commission, to develop their positions. They would only need to fine tune their 
arguments for the Court. The Court, with a record in hand, would know what 
the Commission’s reasons were at the time it formulated the rule and will not be 
swayed by ex post, ad hoc policy arguments, arguments that tend to be poorly 
substantiated and miss the point, since the issue is not whether the Community 
administrator acted reasonably in retrospect but at the time the rule was 
adopted.
D. Limits to the Possible Reach o f Notice and Comment in the Community
Two important qualifications must be made to the possible reach of notice and 
comment in the Community and any impact it might have on administration, 
positive or negative. First, Community administration in no way has powers
95 This being said, the Court in one case showed itself to be more demanding when assessing 
whether the Community had successfully cleared all of the procedural hurdles for adoption of 
an administrative act. See Angelopharm v. Freie und Hansesladt Hamburg, Case C-212/91, 




























































































comparable to American agencies. Community legislation does not contain the 
far-reaching agency mandates that are characteristic of American statutes.96 For 
instance, hazardous waste legislation in the Community hammers out 
regulatory detail (categories and properties of hazardous waste) that in the 
United States is left to the EPA’s discretion, a consequence of member states’ 
reluctance to relinquish too much power in favor of the Commission.97 
Furthermore, national governments shoulder the bulk of the responsibility for 
developing and enforcing regulation. To return to the hazardous waste example, 
rules on the precautions to be taken by hazardous waste treatment facilities are 
issued by member state authorities in the Community and by the EPA in the 
United States.98 Thus if comitology were reformed to include notice and 
comment, interest groups and the Court would still participate far less than in 
the U.S. for the simple reason that there is relatively little Community 
rulemaking.
Second, even though member states administer a Community regulatory 
scheme, their role is far more independent than that of American states that 
administer federal programs. To take the example of waste regulation again, 
states may develop and administer their own hazardous waste programs but 
they must first be authorized by the EPA (which reviews the program to ensure 
that it is at least as environmentally protective as the federal program) and they 
are obliged to proceed through notice and comment when they draw up the 
programs.99 Under the Community scheme, member states are obliged to 
inform the Commission of their national hazardous waste programs but need 
not obtain authorization from the Commission nor follow any particular 
procedure in developing their waste programs.too (It is important to bear in 
mind that the Commission can enter into negotiations with and ultimately sue 
member states if it believes that national programs fail to guarantee Community 
standards but this is an extraordinary measure unlike program authorization.) 
Not only does this mean that the Commission is poorly placed to ensure 
uniform implementation of hazardous waste legislation but also that it cannot 
require national governments to allow for public participation in rulemaking. 
And it is difficult to picture stricter Commission supervision because of the
96 Many American regulatory statutes are more detailed than the RCRA and therefore the 
balance between legislative and agency influence is more decidedly tipped toward the 
legislature. On the whole, however, American administrative agencies dispose of greater 
discretion in rulemaking than the Commission and comitology committees.
97 Compare Council Directive 91/689, 1991 O.J. (L 377) 20, annexes I n , and III with the 
Resouce Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1994).
98 Compare Council Directive 91/156, 1991 O.J. (L 78) 32, art. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and Council 
Directive 91/689, 1991 O.J. (L 377) 20, art. 2.2, art. 6 with 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994).
99 42 U.S.C. §6926(1994).




























































































various constitutional and political obstacles. In sum, due to narrow delegations 
of power and member state autonomy in the Community’s federal system, the 
import of notice and comment reform would be limited: the rulemaking activity 
to which it would apply, administration communautaire directe is narrow in 
scope and the Community rulemaking to which it would not apply, 
implementation by national governments, is extensive.
VII. A Proposal for Notice and Comment in the Community
A. The Case for a Modified Version of Notice and Comment
Notice and comment would improve public accountability and fairness in 
Community ralemaking. First, the combination of information, interest 
participation, and judicial review would guarantee greater accountability to 
Parliament, the lawmaking agent currently without control instruments, as well 
as the Council, which notwithstanding its comitology veto has very little 
effective power over the tightly knit network of national experts and 
Commission civil servants. Indeed notice and comment is more promising that 
the reform proposals currently on the table because it would generate far more 
information about Community rulemaking and permit more constant political 
oversight. Under the Commission’s proposal, Parliament would receive 
agendas for comitology committee meetings, draft measures submitted to the 
committees, and the results of voting. 101 The underlying scientific evidence and 
policy analysis, however, would not necessarily be communicated to 
Parliament. And even if Parliament were to receive all of the information used 
by the Commission and committees in rulemaking, it would not have the staff 
and resources necessary to review it for objectionable policy choices and 
questionable scientific rationales. In notice and comment, politicians can count 
on interest groups and courts to force information from agencies, carefully 
scrutinize regulatory choices, and bring controversial rales to their attention. 
The Commission and Parliament proposals also include a formal role for 
Parliament in rulemaking. According to the Commission proposal, upon a 
negative comitology committee opinion (or if no opinion is delivered) the 
proposed rale would no longer be sent to the Council but would be submitted to 
the legislative process, thus bringing in both Parliament and the Council. 102 
Parliament’s proposal would allow Parliament (and the Council) to veto all 
proposed rales, in response to which the Commission could either withdraw the
101 Proposal for a Council Decision laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, 24 June 1998, art. 7, COM (1998) 380 
final.




























































































rule, amend it, or submit it to the full legislative process. 103 In both, 
involvement of the Parliament or the Council would be sporadic, in the first 
because comitology committees very rarely issue negative opinions and in the 
second because a majority vote against a proposed rule is a time-consuming 
step that would only occur in the event of highly controversial policy issues 
that politicians feel they cannot ignore. In notice and comment, by contrast, 
interest groups and courts serve as proxies for lawmakers in each and every 
rulemaking proceeding.
The second benefit of notice and comment would be interest group 
participation in rulemaking, something which the current reform proposals 
overlook entirely. In the Community’s pluralist order where multiple interest 
groups compete to influence the legislative process, notice and comment would 
ensure that the wide spectrum of interests involved in policy formulation would 
also have a say in policy implementation. In other words, the Commission and 
national experts (and sometimes the Council when charged with passing 
implementing rules) would no longer have the power to shut out interests 
downstream in the policymaking process.
Moderation, however, should be the cornerstone of any eventual reform. 
Along with notice and comment comes a slower, more cumbersome rulemaking 
process. This flaw is to a certain extent unavoidable in a system with multiple 
lawmakers but Americans tolerate more than the inevitable because of their 
distrust of experts and respect for courts. Although it is even more difficult to 
generalize about "European" beliefs than American ones, experts appear to 
command more prestige in Europe. Regulators unfettered by politicians is 
perceived by many as the best means of enforcing antitrust law, deregulating 
telecommunications, protecting privacy, and achieving a host of other 
objectives. As part of the market liberalization efforts of the past two decades, 
much of which has been prompted by the Community, a host of agencies that 
escape the normal chain of command from party and prime minister to cabinet, 
minister, and bureaucrat have been set up in the member states. 104 Several 
academic works on Community government argue that regulation should be left 
almost entirely to the experts. 105 In light of these views, any eventual reform 
should be careful to retain a greater role for expertise than is the case in the 
United States.
103 Resolution on the modification of the procedures for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission -'commitology’ (Council Decision of 13 July 1987), 16 
Sept. 1998, art. 2(b).
104 See, e.g., Cassese, S. (1995) La nuova costituzione economica, Rome, Laterza.
105 Majone. supra note 3; Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (1997) "From Intergovernmental 




























































































Furthermore, courts in Europe are not perceived and accepted as quasi­
political, policymaking institutions as in the United States. In the member 
states, judges other than constitutional judges are thought to be skilled 
professionals who scientifically apply codes and statutes and, to the extent they 
must engage in gap-filling, do so using accepted canons of construction that 
leave little room for discretion and value judgments. 106 The European Court of 
Justice, the only directly relevant court for the purpose of our discussion 
because of its jurisdiction over Community acts, is recognized as a powerful 
constitutional court. The Court has its limits as policymaker though. Its role 
rests on enforcement of the Treaties and Community law against non­
complying member states and not so much against the Community institutions 
themselves. It is therefore unclear whether tough review by the Court of Justice 
of Community implementing measures of the sort that it applies to member 
state laws would be considered legitimate. In the absence of a strong tradition 
of quasi-political judicial action either in the member states or in the 
Community, institutional reform must take pains to carefully define a restrained 
role for courts. Otherwise the Community bureaucracy might come to be 
perceived as accountable to fifteen unelected judges in Luxembourg, not the 
European public.
Another disadvantage of American rulemaking, special interest 
influence, might also be a cost of reform. A secretive, closed process like the 
one currently in place in the Community allows a certain degree of freedom 
from interest group pressure for the simple reason that lobbying groups do not 
know when their national representatives act or fail to act in their interest. 
Although, for reasons already mentioned, the public choice critique is not 
particularly forceful, in Brussels special interests, principally multinational 
corporations, appear to overwhelm interest groups with more diffuse 
constituencies such as small business associations and consumers. 107 Until 
these imbalances in interest representation are remedied, a more modest version 
of notice and comment is in order. The combination of information, formal 
interest participation, and courts should be tempered to avoid excessive 
manipulation of the system by a few small but powerful interests.
106 See Brewer-Carfas, A.R. (1989) Judicial Review in Comparative Law, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, at 168; Landfried, C. (ed.) (1988) Constitutional Review and 
Legislation, Baden-Baden, Nomos; Cappelletti, M. (1971) Judicial Review in the 
Contemporary World, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill. at 45-68.
107 See Cawson, A. (1997) "Big Firms as Political Actors: Corporate Power and the 
Governance of the European Consumer Electronics Industry", in Wallace, H. and Young, A. 
R. (eds.) Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
185-205; Young, A. R. (1997) “Consumption Without Representation? Consumer in the 
Single Market”, in Wallace, H. and Young, A. R. (eds.) Participation and Policy-Making in 




























































































B. The Reform Proposal
Community rulemaking that would combine the basic elements of the American 
system with some of the reform ideas advanced to curb litigation and special 
interest excesses would take the following form. The Commission would issue 
notice of a proposed implementing rule in the Official Journal, solicit 
comments, and where appropriate hold a public meeting. At this first stage, the 
Commission might very well be required to disclose opinions expressed by 
national representatives on the comitology committee (it regularly consults the 
committees before submitting proposals for a formal vote) to justify its policy 
choices. It would then issue a revised proposal, explaining why it did or did not 
choose to adopt the suggestions made by the participating individuals and 
organizations. Although the scientific studies and other evidence relied upon by 
the Commission could not, for obvious practical reasons, be published along 
with the proposed rule, they would be made available to members of the public 
through other means. The measure would then be submitted to the comitology 
committee for its opinion. If positive, the final implementing rule would be 
published in the Official Journal and would contain a statement of basis and 
purpose essentially replicating the explanation and justification set forth in the 
Commission’s initial and revised proposals. If the opinion were negative (or in 
the case of a regulatory committee, not forthcoming), the Commission proposal 
would be sent on to the Council, which would be obliged to give a detailed 
statement of reasons only if it decided to modify the Commission measure. 
Again, the final implementing rule published in the Official Journal would 
contain a statement of basis and purpose reproducing either the Commission’s 
or the Council’s rationale.
Individuals or firms would be able to challenge implementing rules but 
only after they were enforced by national authorities. Domestic courts would 
ensure that requests for preliminary references were well-founded by examining 
the statement of basis and purpose published with the final rule or requesting 
that parts of the record be sent from Brussels. The Court would review statutory 
interpretation claims based upon text and canons of interpretation and fact- 
based claims for manifest error of appraisal, a deferential standard of review 
with considerable Court precedent. These old judicial review tools, however, 
would have more bite because of the extensive record at the Court’s disposal. 
The parties and the rulemaking institution would be limited to the claims and 
evidence already advanced in the rulemaking proceeding. Lastly, the Court 
would either uphold the implementing rule, declare invalid the measure, or, in 
what would constitute a novel remedial power, remand the measure to the 





























































































C. Dissecting the Proposal
This rulemaking proposal contains three basic elements: administrative 
procedure, locus standi rules, and review in the Court of Justice. The 
administrative procedure component is a straightforward application of 
American rulemaking to comitology. This part of the reform would require a 
Community legislative act, most likely a decision.
The part of the proposal concerning locus standi rules departs fairly 
radically from the American system. Here I incorporate Mashaw’s suggestion 
on limiting the availability of review. Post-enforcement review would 
discourage firms from turning to courts in the absence of strong claims against 
the Community bureaucrat, limiting judicial interference with bureaucratic 
expertise. To accomplish this part of the reform nothing in the current system of 
locus standi and preliminary references would have to change. As explained 
earlier, Community implementing rules can only be challenged by individuals 
and firms through national court systems. Although national locus standi rules 
vary tremendously, a firm must generally wait until sued by its member state for 
non-compliance and then defend on the grounds that the Community act was 
illegal, requesting the domestic court to refer the question to the Court of 
Justice. Leaving locus standi as is would not only reduce incentives to resort to 
litigation but might also ameliorate the current imbalance in Community 
interest representation. National courts would serve as point of access to the 
judicial review component of rulemaking and therefore interest groups would 
not need to be well-organized in Brussels with the resources to employ 
expensive Brussels lawyers but could rely on local counsel in their national 
courts and even in the European Court. 108
Undoubtedly, there are drawbacks to preliminary references. The most 
serious is that groups not called upon to comply with rules but that nevertheless 
suffer their consequences might be denied access to national courts. Recently, 
locus standi rules have been harmonized for public interest groups that seek to 
enforce Community consumer protection legislation, an innovation that holds 
promise for equity in rulemaking review. 109 A second problem with access to 
the Court through the preliminary reference system is the legal uncertainty that 
would very likely result. Unlike direct review, litigants are not bound by strict 
time limits when they challenge Community acts through preliminary
108 in a system that limits parties to the record developed before the agency, the success of 
such a challenge rests on the comments submitted during the rulemaking proceeding and 
therefore interests, to stand a chance in court, would nevertheless need the resources to track 
Community proposed rules, analyze them, and submit comments.
109 See Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 




























































































references. They must raise the issue during national enforcement proceedings, 
which in some countries will be initiated much later than in others, thus 
creating the danger that a Court decision declaring an implementing rule illegal 
will be handed down after widespread application in other member states. One 
possible solution would be to write Community implementing rules to include a 
time limit applicable to legal challenges through the preliminary reference 
system. This would put pressure on groups that wish to exercise this legal right 
to coordinate Community-wide their opposition and litigate the issue when the 
rule is first enforced at national level, wherever that happens to be. 
Notwithstanding all the possible flaws, rulemaking review through national 
courts is still the best course because it would reduce the risk of unwieldy, 
cumbersome litigation of the sort that frustrates American administrative 
action. And if access to the Court proves unsatisfactory, Community locus 
standi rules can always be liberalized, after the basics of a notice and comment 
system are already in place.
The last element of my reform proposal, judicial review, would involve a 
mix of old and new. First is the standard of review issue. The Court would 
analyze claims that an implementing rule rests upon a flawed interpretation of 
the Treaties or legislation (known as basic measures) as it always has, using 
text and canons of interpretation. It would also entertain more fact-based, 
policy-oriented challenges to implementing rules. In including a role for the 
Court on such issues, 1 reject Pierce’s suggestion that arbitrary and capricious 
review be eliminated. His proposal would cut down too drastically on the 
benefits of notice and comment: a rulemaking process without substantive 
judicial review risks being one in which agencies do not explain their decisions 
in terms comprehensible to the general public and interest group comments go 
unread in agency filing cabinets. 110 The standard of review for fact-based 
claims, however, should be written (in the Community act setting down notice 
and comment) to suggest a deferential attitude toward Commission policy calls. 
This standard could be "manifest error of appraisal," one of the headings under 
which such challenges may be brought currently and which suggests 
unintrusive judicial review.
The second issue that arises is a procedural one concerning the 
arguments the parties and rulemaking institution would be permitted to raise. In 
American rulemaking review, under what is known as the Chenery rule,ill the 
parties and agency are normally only permitted to raise arguments and 
evidentiary claims that were already raised in the administrative proceeding.
110 But see Dehousse, supra note 11, at 18-22. Dehousse argues that Community notice and 
comment procedure with Court review' exclusively for violation of procedural rights would 
create public debate and openness.




























































































This makes the process more efficient by requiring litigants to express their 
views at the first opportunity possible and therefore, with any luck, settling the 
dispute without any need for a court. The Chenery rule also ensures that the 
agency, the institutional actor responsible for rulemaking and best-suited to 
assess the scientific evidence and make the policy choices, has had an 
opportunity to consider all of the parties’ objections and suggestions. Such a 
principle in the Community context would improve the quality of the debate 
before the Commission as well as lighten the Court’s caseload.
The last issue that crops up in judicial review is remedies. The Court 
currently may afford only one type of remedy if it finds an implementing rule 
illegal in a preliminary reference proceeding: it may declare the rule or selected 
parts of the rule invalid. My proposal would give it the alternative, again taken 
from American administrative law, of sending the implementing rule back to 
the responsible Community institution for further explanation or development 
of the evidentiary record. This is a question of expediency and good judicial 
practice more than anything else. A remand is far less time-consuming and 
disruptive for the agency than a judgment striking the rule and forcing the 
agency to start the proceeding from scratch. Ironically, this might be the most 
radical feature of my proposal, for the Treaty does not contemplate this form of 
judicial remedy and therefore might require an amendment. VI.
VIII. Conclusion
The complex and constantly changing nature of Community government can 
sometimes obscure the basic issues of institutional design that must be settled. 
In the sphere of administrative action those design problems, tied to the 
Community’s constitutional structure, are unmistakable. First, the public 
institutions charged under the Treaties with lawmaking, most notably 
Parliament and to a lesser extent the Council, lack the devices needed to ensure 
that the administration executes their policy choices as intended. Second, the 
full constellation of interests that influence policy formulation are not 
guaranteed a voice in policy implementation. The improvements that reform 
would bring are also plainly visible. First, by generating copious information 
and enlisting interest groups and courts in the accountability endeavor, notice 
and comment would put Parliament and the Council in a better position to 
monitor and control Community rulemaking. Second, the formal procedure for 
public participation in rulemaking would carve out a place for interests that had 
taken part in the pluralist lawmaking process, not entirely automatic in a system 
where only one of three lawmakers, i.e. the Commission, shoulders most of the 
responsibility for rulemaking. Thus all the advantages that interest groups bring 
to administrative action—fairness, information, public debate, and compliance— 




























































































action and special interest capture, can be contained by tinkering with the place 
courts occupy in the rulemaking system. Even though improved democratic 
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